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THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.

CHAPTER I*
D E F 1 N 1 T 1 0 N :-

According to the celebrated

definition of Chief Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth College Case, corporations are defined to be, "artificial beings, invisable, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law";but in recent years, there has been, and in
most cases with much justice, a strong tendency from a
practical and business standpoint, to question the precise
accuracy of this definition, claiming that we should look
through the legal entity to the persons who compose the
same, thus treating the corporation for certain purposes as
substantially consisting of several natural beings, rather
than as one intangible artificial being.

Such was practic-

ally the view taken when a corporation was held to be a
citizen for the purpose of jurisdiction, and again, when
held to be a person, so also in cases of fraudulent practices, etc..

In fact it would seem that a corporation is

nothing more nor less than a partnership with certain privileges and liabilities attached.
C L A S S i

F I C A T I 0 N :-

According to one

principle of classification, all corporations a:'e

divided

into domestic or foreign, accordingly as they are organized or incorporated within or without the State,and by such
as are incorporated without the State, calied foreign corporations, are meant not only those incorporated in other nations, but also such as are incorporated in other States of
the same nation.
Again

foreign corporations may well be subdivided

for our convenience,

into two great general classes , as

follows:
First:-

Such as are engaged in commerce,

interstate

or international.
Second:- All other foriegn corporations.
Corporations chartered by the general government,
such as national banks, certain railroad corporations, etc.
belong to neither of the above subdivisions, but rather,
should be treated as domestic corporations with certain additional privileges, such as freedom from taxation on their
franchises, without consent of Congress, upon the ground
of their

being agents of the government.

( Mc Culloch v.

Maryland, 4 Wheat.,
Wheat.,

738;

316,368;

Osborn v. Bank of U. S.,

Cal. v. R. R. Co.,

127 U. S.,l;)

9

However,

their property within the State is not exempt from an equal
taxation with all other property of that State. (Railroad
Co. v.

Peniston, 18 Wall.,
C 0 M I T Y :-

5)

Comity is a common law privilege or a

act of courtesy by which foreign corporations are allowed
to exercise their corporate powers in any or all of the

various States

and nations.

ter of grace, that is,
Mortz . Vol. 11., #9,58

It is not a right but a mat-

it rests in the will of the State.
)

In general all foreign corporations whether of the
first or second class, may exercise by this common law
comity all corporate privileges given to

them by their

charter, riot only in the State creating them, but also in
each or all of the several States of the Union, so long
as such exercise does not interfere with public policy or
laws, expressed or implied, of such other State or States.
In other words, while a State may not grant to a corporation a franchise(which is the conferring of special privileges or immunities riot allowed to the community at large)
to be exercised as of right in another State, the laws of
a State having no extra-terrirorial effect, still by comity

Each state may and generally does extend to all duly incorporated foreign corporations,

the legal right to carry on

its business within its jurisdiction.

(Mort. Vol.II. #958)

This courtesy, as indicated, may be withheld at pleasure.
And why should it be otherwise?
ocr one state

Why should the local laws

be forced upon the people of another State?

Such would be inconsistent with State sovereighty.
As to foreigh corporations of the

first class, with

one possible exception hereafter to be mentioned, they have
not only the common law right of comity but also a constitutional right which can only be taken away by Congress
itself and with which the States have no right whatever to
interfere, while as to the second ciass, the right of comity only is theirs, and even that right may be limited or
denied.
A reference to history would present many instances
of the e3xercise of this privilege among nations.
porations organized

in

contracts with various

Many cor-

the United States have entered into
foreign nations, but nowhere can a

decision be found in which the validity of these contracts
has ever been questioned by such foreign nations, and to

presume that the inforcement of the

same will ever be de-

niod in America, on such grounds, could be based upon no
sound reasoning in view of t1e

past history and present

trend of the American courts on this subject.
While this has uniformly passed unquestioned among
nations, yet in some of the very early cases

it was earn-

estly contended that it had no application among the several States; but later in the case of the Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 13 Pet.,

586, it is stated that riot unly has it

an historical precedence

--

that of usage

--

but also num-

erous decisions from nearly all the States on which to base
this claim.

Further, the court said:

"The public and well-

known and long continued usage of trade;
quiescence of the States;

the general ac-

the particular legislation in

some of them, as well as the legislation of Congress

--

all

recognize the existence of this principle."
Again in the case of Christian Union v.
U.S.,

56, the court said:

Yount, 101

"In harmony with the general law

of comity obtaining among the States composing the Union,
the presumption should be indulged that the corporations of
one State

not forbidden by the laws of its

being,

may

exercise within any other State the general powers conferred
by its own charter, unless it is prohibited from so doing,
either in the direct enactments of the latter State, or by
its public policy, to be deduced from the general course
of legislation or from the settled adjudications of its
highest courts."
Thus,again, its seems, as has often been said,
*silence gives consent".

C H A P T E R

II.

TAXATI ON.

Section I;-

Of such foreign corporations as are

not engaged in interstate or international commerce,

i.e.

those of the second class.
Section II.-

Of such foreign corporations as are

engaged in interstate or international commerce, i.e.
those of the first class.
SECTION I*

Taxation of Non-interstate

or

Non-international Foreign

Corporations

That such corporations may be taxed, as a matter
of law, can scarcely be

questioned, but as to the grounds

upon which this conclusion has been reached and the extent
to which the same may be exercised, our attention will now
be turned.
In treating of this subject we will consider the
same in the following order:First:-

The right of a State to tax a foreign

corporation as a condition precedent to its entering

and

doing business within its territory, and the extent of
such taxation.
Second:-

Its right to tax such foreigr co rporation

as are already legally within the State.
(First)
A solution of this first proposition involves, in
connection with the principles of comity, an answer to
the following question :
Is a corporation a citizen within the meaning of
that clause of the United States constitution whiah says
: " The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities

of the citizens in the several

States'?
Prdor to the &.doption of the

constitution, there

was no provision by which either the citizens or corporations of one State were entitled to the privileges and rights
of.the samein other States

The Articles of Confederation

were silent

on this subject and Congress was powerless

to interfere

,

hence the matter: was left entirely in thu

9ntro 1 of the several States and such States -4ith thei- own

personal ends
Great *as

in view passed such laws as they saw fit.

the variety thereof.Much unfriendly and inmartial

legislation was promiscuously praotised throughout the Unit
ed Statesgiving rapid -cowth to a spirit of antaguni.r;.
Retaliation which to day is exercised among many
of the foreign countries seemed inevitably to be their controlinr

principle-a principle which can and could not be

consistently practiced among the

citizens of those States

whose intention was to form one indistructable Union of
indistructable States". Harmony and uniformity, so essential to such a Union, were rapidly being displaced.

An

(Union
f
ever widening gulf seemed inevitably to sunder that bond
which were to bind them as one.
Such a condition of affairs furnished one of the
moving causes of the adoption of the present constitution.
Foreseeing the inevitable results, the framers of that
greatest of instruments, with much wisdom, introduced the
clause above referred to, namely: " The

citizens of eac--

States shall be entitled to all privileges and imnmunities
of the citizens of the several States."
That

no State has a right to interfere to prevent

any citizen from entering its State arid engaging in, as an

individual, in like mariner and on equal footing with its
own citizens, has since the incorporation of this clause into
the constitution never been questiored.

And it was earnest

ly contended thatthe word "citizen", as there used,should,
in like mannerapply to a corporation; that no State should
be allowed to exclude, refuse to admit, or unjistly tax
amy such foreign corporation any more than a citizen of
another State.

This led to an examination of the compar-

ative meanings of the word"corporation" and the word "citizeng
Cooley 3ays; "The privileges arid immunities in said
clause belong only to State citizenship and which, were it
not for this clause, might be subject to hostile State legisiation."

Again, in Conner V. Elliott,

18 How., 591,

"According to the expressed words and clear meaning odf this
clause no privileges are secured by it but those which pertain to citizenship."

As to the meaning of the term citi-

zen as here used and for proof that a corporation is not
considered a citizen within such meaning, no more authoritative references can be made than to the cases of Paul v.

ii
Virginia, 8 Wall.,
Pet.,

168, and Bank of Augusta v.

586.
Of these two cases,

as

Earle, 13

the Paul case is generally cited

the leading authority arid the opinion is perhaps one of

the

most scholarly discussion e er written upon the subject,
and an extensive examinatio)n of the same may here be made
with profit, as involving both the subject of comity and
corporations.

In this case the court said, "The term"cit-

izen"as here used,appliesonly to naturql persons, members
of the body politic, uwing allegiance to the State, and
not to corporations which are artificial persons created by
legislation and possessing only the attributes which legislation,has prescribed.
foreign
Btate,

It was there ,furtherurged that as the

corporation was composed of citizens of another
the courts should look behind the artificial being to

the real persons composing the same so asto afforC

them

protection, citing an early decision, (2 How.4J7), but that
ease was expressly confined to a question of jurisdiction
ar

did not extend to contracts,made by corporations.

The

c.u-t said, "If it were to embrace contracts,and the members of the corporation were to be regarded as individuals
carrying on business in the corporate name, and therefore

entitled to privileges of citizens, they must at the same time
take upon themselves the liability of citizens arid be bound
by their contracts in like manner:

that the result of which

would be to make the corporation a mere partnership each
being individually liable for the debts of the corporation:
that the

clause of the constitution could never intended

to give citizens of each State the privileges of citizens
of the several States and at the same time to have exempted
them from the liabilities

attendant upon the exercise of

such privileges in those States for, this

would be to give

the citizens of other States higher and greater privileges
than are enjoyed by the citizens of the State itself,and
would deprive each State of control over the
franchises within the State.

granting of

Extra-territorial operation

would be given to local legislation destroying the independence and harmony of the States.

Men of wealth from

other States would practically control the business of
States.

these

The only way to keep them out would be to

deprive their own citizens of the same priviiges."
I

Whenever a corporation makes a contract it is the
contract of the legal entity,

the artificial

being created

by its charter,and riot the contract of the individual

members thereof.

The

only rights it can claim are

those

that character, arid riot the rights

which are given to it in

•

The

estion doubtless was intended to place the

cit-

which belongs to its members as citiz ens of a State
clause in

izens of each State upon the same

footin

with citizens of

other States so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in these States are concerned.

It relieves them

from the disabilities of alienage in other States;it inhibits dis criminating legislation against them by other State
it

gives them the right

of free

ingress

into the S tate

and egress from them, thus forming the present grand Union
without which it would have been little more than a league
of States.
citioens o"

But the privileges and immunities secured to
each State in the several States, by the pro-

Nision in question, are such as are common to the citizens
of the latter States under their constitution and laws by
virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed
by citizens in their own State are riot secured in other
States by this provision.
It

This could not be expected.

was not intended by it to give to the laws of one

State, any operation in other States.

They have no such

operation except by the permission expressed or implied of
those States.

The special privilege which they confer,

must, therefore, be enjoyed at home, unless the assent
of the other States to this enjoyment therein is given. A
grant of corporate existence is a grant of special privilegeto the corporation to enable it to act for certain
designated purposes as a single individual and exempting
it

from individual liability.

"The corporation being the

mere creature of local law can have no legal existence
beyond the limit of the sovereignty where created.As said
Bank of Aug.

v Earle"It

must dwell

in

creation and cannot migrate to anotier

in

the place of its
5overeigrty."

The recognition of its existence even by other
States and the enforcement of its contracts make them depend entirel$ upon the comity of those States;

a comity

which is never granted when the existence of the corporation or the existence of its power is prejudicial to their
interests or repugnant to their policy."
Having no absolute
States,

right

of recognition

but depending for such recognition and

ment of its

contracts upon their

in

other

the enforce-

consentit follows,

as a

matter of course, that such may be granted upon such terms
and conditions as those States may think proper to impose.
They may exclude the foreign corporation entirely; they
may restrict the business to particular localities or exact
such security for performance of its contracts with their
citizens, as in their judgement, will best promote the
public interest.
tion,"

The whole matter rests in their discre-

They may tax them at their pleasure, without even

being questioned as to the imtive for the same. ( People v.
Phili. Fire Ins. Co. 92 N. Y. 311.)
The leading case of the Bank of Augusta v. Earle
13 Pet. 586.,
therein,

decided prior to the Paul Case and cited

also holds that a corporation is not a citizen

and that it can have no extra-territorial operation except
as it is either expressly or impliedly granted.
While the same question had been up before the court
prior to the Paul and Georgia decisions, in the case of
v.

Providence Irs. Co.,

2 Craneh 127;also in the Dart-

mouth College Case 4 Wheat. 636, in both of which Chief
Justice Marshall wrote the opinion, and later in the case
of Bank of U. S. v.

Dandridge,

12 Wheat.

64,

besides in

Head

numerous other eases since, yet it has always been with
the same result and invariably have the Paul and Geogia
been cited
cases/\ as standard authority whenever the exact question has
since appeared before the courts.
The leading case in New York on this subject is
case of the People v. Phila. Fire iris.
cited above,

Co.

the

92 N. Y. 311,

in which a very able opinion was written by

Finch, J. - the same case being approved in Phila. Fire
Ins. Co. v.

State 119 U. S. 110

the case of Pembina Min.
which Bradley,

,

*

To the same effect is

"o. v. Pa. 125 U. S. 181, in

quoted extensively from the Paul Case.

To the above rule,

that any condition precedent,

may be required, there is

the exception as already indica-

ted, that a State may riot demand, that a corporation shall
not appeal to the United States courts-a corporation for
that purpose being held to be a

citizen

and hence protected

by the U. S. Constitution.
Prior to 1844, no where either in England or America
had a corporation been so considered for any purpose, but
in

that year the courts held in

Letsor, 2How. 497,

the case of Louisville

that where a corpovationr

laws of a certain State,

R.

is created by

it is legally presumed that its

IL. v.

members

are

citizens

of that State,
is

or against such corporation
of the State creating-

it

,

a suit

20 How. 227;
itwas

presumption was

Baltimore & Ohio R. R.

R. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 6F5 ) Logically,

but a step

foreign State

! artheare,

to hold that the members of a
in

like manner,

citizens of such

for the parpose of jurisdiction,

in suits by or against

and hence,

for eign corporations it amounted to

citizens of bne State or the State itself

citizens of anouher State.
lO& U.

by

Covington Draw Bridge Co. v. Shepherd,

foreign corporatioti

the

suit

agai rist citizens

>Jater this

held to be conclusive.(Marshall v.
Co. 16 How. 314;

and that a

S. 118.

S teamship Co.

v.

against the
Tuginan

Arid further, that a State cannot restrain

a fleign corporation from resorting to Federal jurisdictions

see Iris.

Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Doyle v. Conti-

nental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535;

also Barron v. Burnside, 121

U. S. L86.
It is in this class of decisions that we for the
first

time,

notice a

the corporate entity

tendency of the courts

to look through

to the individual members composing

the sa-me.
From the above discussions we may extract the

following legal propositions:-

that a

corporation is not a

citizen within the meaning of that clause of the constitution which secures

to the citizens o," 6ne state all the

privileges and immunities of the citiens in the several
States"; that a foreign corporation not engaged in interstate commerce has no ertra-territorial rights;

that it

may, without obtaining express consent,exercise the privileges granted to it by its charter, outide of the State
creating it, only by comity;

that

this comity is always

extended by the States unless contrary to public policy
or an expeess statute etc.;

that a State may meet a for-

oign corporation at its border and demand as a prerequisite to its entering, any condition it may see fit to imposq
except that it may not interfere with its right of appeal
to the United States Courts;

that itmay impose various

taxes and hence may absolutely refuse? admittance, for as
said by Chief Justice Marshall, "the power to taxincludes
the power to exclude", or that in substance.
From the above it would seem that the

question is

not, as to whether a State may require of a foreign corporatior, about to

'riter its jurisdiction, a condition preced-

ent, but rather as to whether the condition imposed is in

fact a condition precedent.

This is well illustrated in

the case of People v. Phila. Fire Ins. Co.,

92 N. Y. 311,

a full discussion of which will appear later.
Recalling the real objects of the clause in question, that one of the most important of them was to secure
the

free right of the citizens of one State to carry on any

lawful business allowed to the citizens in other States,on
equal footing with such citizens in those States;

tthat

it was to secure liberties and privileges and uniform laws;
and remembering that most of the business was then carried
on by citizens in their individual capacity;

that the num-

erous great railroad, telegraph, and ;arge manufacturing
corporations of the present day, could scarcely have been in
contemplation

of the framers

of the constitutiozi,;

in early times corporations wer
artificial beings etc.,

that

considered strictly as

and looked upon with much distrust,

could we,in the light of all

these

factsreasonably expect

any other decision than was reached in the Paul and

Virgii

ia cases, namely, that a corporation is not a citizen withthe meaning of that word as

above used?

But on the other hand, remembering that time often
makes many changes;

that now, as said by BrJdley, J. "The

larger part of the business of this country has come to be
transacted by corporations which have been found, since
earlier decisions of the Paul and Virginia

cases,

th

to be so

convenient, especiaily as avoiding a dissolution of membership, while their most objectionable
of members- has
or in part;"

in most instances been abrogated in whole

that since those early decisions corporations

have gradually come
light -the

feature -non-liability

to be looked upon in a much different

tendency being not to consider them so much as

artificial beings, but rather t6 look through the corporate
fictionto the members who actually compose

the same- to

lcok at the effect rather than the form. Arid further, bearing in mind, as said by Bradley, J.,

that" so strongly

is

this modern view of a corporation feltthat, in the recent
case of Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co.,

118

U. S. 394, the doctrine that corporations are not citizens
or persons within the protective language of the constitution, was unanimously disproved, and the court expressly
held that they are entitled, as well as

individuals, to the

equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amenda
ment";that in effect tho same retalitory legislations which
were so destructible prior to the constitution and which

the clause in

question in that instrument ospeciaily in-

tended to avoid, are to day being freely,exercised by all
the States with scarcely a restriction upon the same disastrous results, whici
is

brought about by th

then so 7tirr'ed the people;
fact

that

tl-at this
theni

the business that was

carried on by individual citizens whom the constitution
provided for, is

to day, as referred to above, being con-

ducted almost entirely by corporations which are held not
to be citizens and hence not equally protected by the constitution;ca1 we,in the

faceof all this, come to an$ other

conclusion than that one of the principal effects of the
clause in question has practically, to a great extent
become nugatory?
In view of the above,may we not,with much reason,
question whether or riot a corporation should not 4n effect
be considered a citizen to the extent at least that the
corporations of one State may be entitled to all the privileges etc .of the corporations in the several States?

Why

is there riot to day the same reason for giving to the corporations of ome State

such privileges in the several State

as there was to give these corrosponding rights to the citizens of the various States in the several States? Corpora-

tions are,in reality,nothing but

a combination of citizens

for the purposes of facilitating business; nothing but a
partnership with certain additional privileges and liabilities. This view is strongly favored in the above case,
holding a corporation to be a person, and again in those
cases holding it to be a citizen for the purposes of jurisdiction.

Why if for such purposes, it may be hold to be a

person or a citizen, should riot the same reasoning entitle
it to be consideded a citizen for ether purposes-especially
taxation-arid thus allow them to freely enter the states
without complying with conditions precedent?

Such a hold-

ing aould riot only seem reasonable, but i n the light of
the present tentency of the courts, would also seem to be
necessary that justice may be had.

It would avoid many of

the practical injustices , hereafter to be mentioned, which
were intended

to be prevented by hoiding that a corporation

was a person, and again it would furnish an amicable dispoF
al of many conflicting opinions in

regard to interstate c( m-

merce corporations which will also be

discussed later.

To bring about this change, that a corporation be considered a citizen , in the light of the many established
decisions uniformly kolding the contrary,

arid the reluctan-

of the courts to reverse their own decisions, perhaps the
only practical wayof accomplishing the same would be by
amendment

to the United 5tates Costitution.

(Second)
The extent

to which a

fore~grn corporation may be

taxed in this or any other State.
Assuming, for this purpose

, that a foreign corpo-

ration is lawfully within this State, either by comity or
by complying with such conditions aw the State may rightfully have imposed, the questions
May such State tax it more

follow:
severely than it does

its own domestic corporations, or may such foreign corporations refuse to submit to any greater burdens than are imposed on the ( mnestic corporations engaged in a like
business?

May such foreign corporation demand equal

treatment and protection under that clause of the U. S.
constitution which says that 'no State shall deny to any
persin within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws,"

or in other words is a foreign corporation admitted

into tnis or any 6ther State a person within the meaning
of this clause?
That judges in interpreting the meaning of the various provisions of the U. S. constitution should investigate the surrounding circumstances or emergencies giving

rise to the introduction of such provisionf
should endeavor
th<

same,

to ascertain the

intent of

by an examination of the debates

that they
he framers

of

in the consti-

tutional -.
nd various State conventions and the discussions
in the Federalist, must be recognized as a
accepted and proper rule to follow

generally

(Cooley's Const. Law,

p 157)
Were

this an absolute and inflexible rule, as claim-

ed by some, well might it be doubted whether a corporation
should be included in the clause in question, for while much
discord had arisen over the regulations of corporations
prior to that time, yet nowhere, in all the discussions
leading to the adoption of the same,

can it be shown that

the subject of corporations r~ceiv- d any attention whatover and perhaps

it

might seem strange

that in

the light

of

these facts, had it been their intention to provide for the
same
tion.

, that they did not give them at least a passing menEspecially would this seem natural, as some of the

courts at that ti;ne had held a contrary view to what is
now claimed. Ducit v. Chicago, 95 Am. Dec.

and notes.)

Such were the arguments presented in the cases following the Fourteenth Amendment,

in which the clause in

question may be found # As a matter of factthat corporations were riot discussed,can scarcely be
the Slaughter House Cases 16 Wall.

questioned.

56-81,

In

one of the first

important cases on the subject on this subject, Chief Justice Miller said:
these Amendments

"In the light of the recent history of
(13, 14 and 15) and the Fervading purpose

of them which we have already discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to this clause.

The existence of

laws in a State where newly emancipated negroee resided
which discriminated with gross injustice arid hardship
against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by
the clause and by it such laws are forbidden. Arid further
by way of dictum, he says:
of a State,

"We doubt much whether any action

riot directed by way of discrimination against

the negroes as a class, or on account of their race will
even be held to come within the purview of this clause."
While this dictum was much to,,broad a statement, we cannot
but perceive the courts convinced views as to the meaning df
this

clause.

Such were the cA-iims of many.

Granting t~iis to be true, it must still be bdrn in
mind that at the time
the people were

if the apoption of this Amendment,

in a highly excited state. There was one

thing uppermost and all-absorbing in their minds-the emannegro.

cipation of the receritly enslaved and oppressed
Is it strange

that under such a turmoil of excitement, in

regard to so important a subject, that a more

subordinate

matter sho uld not have received direct attention? Arid
are

we or

that account, to presume that

the framers were

entirely i., orant of the previous use and legal meaning of
the word "person"? or rather should we presume that in the
light of the fact that Blackstone treated of Corporations
under the head of " Rights of Persons,"

where he said, " Per-

soris also are

divided by law into either natural persons v

or artificial"

( Book 1. 123)

taken by Kent

(11.

Kent,
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rant of this legal meaning:?

,

),

and that a like

view was

that they were not

igno-

Are we thus to impose upon the

great men of those days, and give a strict and narrow construction to this word"person"? or are we to look at it
in a broader light and say that it may

include Chinese,

and others similarly oppressed as well as the negro;
t may include

that

artificial as well as natural persons?

Suppose as a matter of fact, the authors of this
clause containing this word, did riot have in mind a corpora
tion, still

the meaning of the word admitting of such a

construction,
we

as shown by Blackstone,

are

Kent and others,

to say, especially when necessity and justice shali demand

otherwise,
of the

that because

framers,

was not

it

the expressed

intention

that the courts cannot so construe it, and

and thus possibly avoid the

trouble and expense of another

amendment? Or is the rule of interpretation sufficiently
elastic in such cases to admit of using the word in its
full legal sense, regardless of the exact meaning intended? That is,at the most,all that would be done by including corporations in the meaning of the word "persons", and
it

is nothing more

before,

both in

than what has o:ten been excercised

England and America.

Many instances will serve to illustrate the recognition of this right to expand the at first supposed limited
meaning of a word into its full meaning, as justice may
demand.

Could we expect that a court which had already

declared that a corporation was a citizen for certain purpe
ses would decline to call

it a person? Certainly riot,

such a conclusion is eminently just.

and

There would seem to

be no reason why a corporation which is composed of individuals

should be denied the equal protection of the laws

or deprived of property without due process of law.

It would seem from this line of reasoning that the word
"person" should include a corporation, and in this conclusion we are sustained by the decisions of many courts.
The

first

arid one of the most important cases upon

this subject and which sustains this conclusion is

the case

of County of Sari Mateo v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co.
Fed. 722, in which, Field, J.,

, 16

writing a very exaustive op-

inion,held that a corporation was such a person for the
purpose of protecting property and was entitled to
equal protection of the law:

the

that while metaphysically cor-

porations have been considered as artificial beings,

etc

yet practically the courts should look behind the mere name
or entity to the persons who actually compose the same;
that they should look to the result or effect of such tax
and riot

at

the mere

that, ihile the

form,

and that by so doing it

tax is said to be a t-.x

of a mere artificial being etc.,

is

found

on the property

yet as a matter of fact

the effect is a tax upon the corporate property of the
individual stockholders who are actual persons and who,
should, ti erefore, be protected as

such,

so far as

taxing

their properrty is concerned.
The theory once held, that a tax on a corporation

is not a tax upon

the persons, or property of the corpo-

ratators or stockholders( 95 Am. D'-c.

520, arid notes) has

now with much reason ceased to be generally recognized,
for in reality the property of the corporation is nothing
more nor less than the property of the individuals, and a
tax on that property is a tax on the irLdividual's property; for while it is claimed that

the tax is

paid out of

the corporate property, that being the individual's property, it is actually paid by the individual.
It would seem that the same result might be reached
by considering the

corporation as a domestic aorporation

after admission within the State, for admitting it by comity or express condition, the State has thus substantially
adopted the charter of the foreigh corporation as if granted by the State itself, but this question has never seemed
to have received attention.
Since the decision in the leadirig case last cited,
the view there laid dowm, has ever since been uniformly
adheired to and notably in the following cases:10 Wall. 65,66; SantaClara Co. v.
Pac. R. R.

118 U. S. 394;

125 U. S. 181;

Southern

Pembina Mining Co. v.

Charlotte, Augusta & Columbia R. R. Co. v.

142 U. S. 386.

Gibbes,

Yet it is claimed that there are corifli.titCg decisions on this

subject.

insisted that Duecat

it

has many times been arg

uL and

v. Chicago 10 Wall. 410, decided pric

to the Fourteenth A m:nd .en

arid the Phila.

Fire Ins.

Co.

v

New YOrk, 119 U. S. 110, de cided since, each support the
opposite view, i. e. that discrimination in taxation may
be made against foreigrn corporations within a State. How
ever,

1 think,

that a careful examination of the same will

show that they may easily be harmonized with

.he present law

as to Corporations, by showing that the question as to
whether a corporation is a person was not properly before
the courts in either of them, but rather that they furnish
excellent

examples of the proposition that a State may impese

any conditi, n precedent
In

to their

enterinr

Ducat V Chicago, 10 Wall. 41C

inois passed statutes requiring all
panies

the same.
the State of 11.-

oreigrn Insurance Com-

to comply with certain conditions as a prerequisite

to their engaging in business within tha State, and furthe;
if they should desire to carry on the same in the city 6f
Chicago, then in addition, they should pay two dollars on
every hundred dollairs of premiurn .

-eceived.

With the

first

statute, the corporation complied, and entered and did
business in the State.

Subsequently it also did business

in the city of Chicago, whereupon the tax 6f two dollars
was demande:i.

Tne corporation 4efused to pay upon th.

ground that having complied with the conditiorns of the
first statute, it was already legally within the State, and
could riot be more severely taxed than the domestic corporations, relying on the constitutional provision in question claiming that the State had

violated the same by

requiring a greater tax from them than from the domestic
corporations doing a like business in Chicago. At first
this might seem to be

true;but when it entered the State,

it was expressly understood that should it desire
engage

to

in business in Chicago, it could do so by paying the

additional tax.

Therefore by fulfilling the

first condi-

tion the corporation was admitted to all parts ef the State
except Chicago, and it knew that if it derired to carry on
business there,
tra conditions.
to do;

that then it must first comply with the exOn entering it,

that otherwise

it impliedly consented so

it was riot lawfully within Chicago,

but only in such other parts of the State as were outside
of Chiaago,

arid hence a

tax of t¢¢o dollars was and might

lawfully be

imposed as a condition precedent

to its doing

business there, and therefore having done business there it
was accordingly
Again,

liable

for the same.

in the case of the People v.

PHila.

Fire Ins.

Co. 311, and in Phila. Fire Ins. Co. -.. New fork, 119 U. S.
110, wi-ere the same case was approved, we, as a matter of
fact, find the same principle

laid down.

New York passed

a statute by which all foreign corporations desiring to do
business in this State should comply with such conditions
and pay such taxes as a condition precedent, as the State
from which it came should require of similar corporations
in
from our State desiring to do business their territory.
With this statute in view and knowing ai

the liability of

a change,the Phila. Fire Ins. Co. FQAght admittance within
the State of New York and paid the tar

imposed by a previo-is

statute of New York, which was a two r;Jrcenit tax, arid continued to carry on business for

a year or

two, when Penn-

sylvania passed a statute by which New York corporations
were obliged to pay a three percent tax , thus increasing
the tax already charged upon the Phii-E.
one percent.
time after

The Company continued

this additional

Fire Iris.

Co. by

to do business for som

imposition but did

riot pay the

extra tax, whereupon New York brought action for the recovery
in

The company claimed that it was already

of the same.
the State,

and had been there for some time prior to the

levying of the additional tax and that therefore such unequal tax was unlawful,
which aays th-It
its

"

under the constitutional

clause

rio State shalL deny to any person within

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws".

But

the court said that inasmuch as the State may impose any
condition precedent,

it

could at any time even revoke such

license and exclude the corporation entirely; that as a mat
ter of fact each certificate receiv4d gave the corporation
license

to act for but one year arid that the end of each

year it

.vias in

law deemed out of thuState and must again

gain admittance arn!

hence comply with the requisites of

that time;ad thiF

,iouldseem to be eminentlg just for

otherwise different corporations

from the same State might

be differently taxed, accordingly as they entered the State
under one statute or another.

On continuing to do business

the corporation impliedly consented to such additional tax
as a prerequisite, and promise to pay the same in the futur
whereupon it was allowed to remain, the State , in effect,
agreeing to wave simply the right to immediate payment.

For example, should A desire

to buy a horse of B, for which

B asked two hundred dollars,

impiiedly B would mean two

hundred dollars in cash, and A would have no legal right
to take the horse without payirg for
for a moment to be said that A and
an

agree ment

be allowed to

irto

B cannot enLe:

either express or implieq,

by which A might

take the horse immediately on agreeiri

to pay

i. e. May riot B waive imnme-

fovriit at some future time?
diate payment?

thessame, BAt is it

Arid so, should B allow A to take the horse
about payment of the two hundred

without saying anything

dollars, would it riot be presumed that A promises to pay
for it

at any time when B should demand the same?B simply

waiving imrediate payment?

And could A after getting pose-

ession of the horse, deny his promise arid still retain poss
ession of the

same?

Such was the relation of the Philaz

Fire Ins. Co. to

the State of New York, and it is with much logic,

it would

seem, that the State was allowed to recover, inasmuch as
the tax was a conditiri

precedent

to entrance

th

into efa-c

State, the corporatiom *iaving no legal existence therein,
so far as t;at

tax was coricerrie , ritil the same was paid.

Hence it riot being within

the

State when the tax was i

-

levied,

the claim that

it

was an unjust taxation,

question

is

without

the clause

in

foundation.

under

As was well

said by Finch, J. in People v. Phila. Fire Ins. Co.
"The

Fourteenth Anendment

can apply to foreign

supra,

insurance

corporations, only after they have performed the conditions
upon which they are entitled to admission;
of the case would involve

this absurdity;

Any ather view
that the company

may agree to pay the tax charged, so as to get within our
jurisdiction, and then refuse
upon the right to remain.

to pay it while insisting

it cannot agree to the condi-

tions and then after admission dispute them.
Thus it is seen that in neither the Ducat nor Phila.
casq, was the corporation in question within the State, and
hence

that they

furnish examples of unjust taxation of for-

eign corporations within the State, as claimed by some,
is

not true.

However they furnish good examples of the

fact

that,that a State may require of such foreign corporations
a condition precedent to their entering such State is no
longer dispute4, but the question being rather as to whether the conditions in question are in fact conditions preced
ent.
From the above

cases

it

would seem, that

the word

"persons" as used in th

Fourteenth

Amendment includes

a foreign corporation;that such a decision has been reached
through a logical course of reasoning based on justice and
historical precedents;

that while in framing the Fourteenth

Amendment its authors may, as has been said by an eminnt
lawyer have

"

builded wiser than they knew" yet we ate

not to be precluded

freom any additional benefit

which

may accrue there from; that in the absence of express terms
we are not to be confined to the use of a word in its limited meaning when justice and the developments of time
demand a more liberal construction.
REAL EFFECT:-

While it has been the tendency of the

courts to hold that foreign corporations within a State
may riot be more severely taxed than the domestic corporations, yet, assuming this to be true, it would still seem,
if we look at the real effects and not at the mere form
that

we have this anomolous situation,which cannot be

avoided under the present holdings of the courts, to wit:
that while a State may fully respect the constitutional
provision

,"

that no State shall deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws", still
it may, in effect, tax any foreign corporation to any extent

it

may desire.

From the fact

tion precedent,
poration
case,

it

for more

or for more

may therefore

may require

refuse

to license

than one year at a time,
than six months,

out of the

state,

as in

the cor-

the Phila.

or for any other length

the State inay as a condition of re-entrance

be again taxed unilimitedly

at the discretion of the State.

the effect? Simply that at any time, by proper

planning,a State may tax any foreign corporation
amounts

any condi-

Thus at the end of each period, being legally

of time,

What is

that it

to any

To be sure the corporation may stay out, but if it

does come in and continues to do business, nowhere in the
constitution can

there be found a clause

to prevent, in el-

fect, a State's practically taxing it every moment of its
stay, heavier than it taxes its own domestic corporations.
I can see no reason, if a corporation should enter New York
State this year, and lay out a large sum of money in any
kind of business, why New York may riot turn around and
practically destroy the greater portion of such property
by simply increasing the

tax

to such an extent as to make

the business unprofitable.
And further while corporations have been held to
be persons, yet by a close examination of the cases

it may

be

any of them squarely hold that

questioned whether

the

clause under consideration, includes corporations for the
purpose of taxation, for in nearly every instance the corporation was found nut to be properly within the State.
If

this be

true nowhere

in

the United

States

constitution

can there be found a provision compelling the States to tax
equalty all property

vrithin their jurisdiction.

some of the State constitutions
pelling equal

there

is

Arid in

no provision com-

taxation. (Cooley's on Amer. Const. Law,317)

This is so in New York. Therefore it would seem, there
being no provision in the United States Constitution or in
The New York Constitution compelling equal taxation of prop
erty, that even after a cprporation has been properly admitted within this State,

still the State is under no obli-

gation to tax it cqually with other corporations.
And again, were we to interpret the provision in q
question in view of the situation at which it was aimed
(the liberation of the
the light

slaves), were we to construe it in h

of the surrounding circumstarices,

etc.

at the

time of its adoption, as is the rule laid down by Brewer,J.
inthe late case of Rector v. U. S. 12 Supr. Ct. Rep. 511,
then might it well be

questioned as to whether there are

39a

sufficient grounds for even holding a corporation to be
person.
For the reasons above stated, especially the first
one, it is evident that the only way for foreign corporations to be certain of receiving fair treatment in
future, is

by considering them citizens.

It

the

may be argued

that the same objection as to uniform taxation applies to
a citizen.

While this may be true, yet practicaliy, the

question will probably never arise.

The government being

based upon the fundamental principles of equality,
the citizens would never submit to the same,were it
attempted.

a

Section II.
Control of Literstate Commerce Corporations
Under the confederation comnerceespeciaily interstate,was very loosely cortrolted.
whatever over the ii-tter;

Congress had no power

it was left entirely to the will

of each State to pass such laws as it might deem most desir
able in regard to all traffic and transportation through
its territory.

This unlimited control in the several State

necessarily gave rise to a great variety of latzs upon the

subject, resulting in much discrimination among the different States- each legislating with its own selfish ends in
view, passing such laws as would most increase its own inte
terests at the expense of the other States.
Naturally this selfishness developed a hostile and
bitter feeling, in consequence of which, much hardship was
experienced particularly by such States as were so situated
as to make it necessary fol:

through other States.

them to carry on their business

Such States were practically at the

mercy of those having particularly fine harbors and advantages,.ind through which it was nec. ssary for them to pass.
Evidently this condition of affairs was destined to
br the source of continuing and increasing troubles, not in

accord with harmony and a "more perfect Union", unless some
means should be devised whereby an amicable disposal of
the matter might be had, and whereby out of discord harmony might reign.
The great men of those days were equal to the
occasion, and in this did they again find another great
cause for the t.option of the United States Constitution.
They saw that scl intimately concerned were the relations of
the people of the several States to each other that any
differences in legislation in respect to them,or any divergency in judicial decision, might lead to infirite contenif left to comity alone
tions and mischiefs,A)and hence to avoid this thly embodied
in the constitution the following remedial clause'Congress
shall have power to regulate commerce bttween the nations

,

among the several States, and with the indian tribes."
By that inst rument such powers as were surrendered
to Congress, were denied to the States, and thus it was
hoped to place the matter beyond further discussion.
not so-so determined was that selfish, antagonistic

But
dispo-

sition, that nct without a thorough construction of this
clause were they to be contented.

The great number of lit-

igated cases on this subject since, and the fact that some

of the States, having the best harbors
to join the Unoin, because

for a time refused

thereby they would lose that

unjust advantage which they then were excercising at the
expense of other States, both furnish the best evidence of
the natural and persistent dispositions of the States

to

encroach upon this forbidden ground, and the wisdom, foresight, and necessity of such a preventative cla us.
As to what constitutes

a regulation of interstate

commerce had for some time caused much dispute.

The variour

States from time to time,in desiring to get around the effects of this clause, haveppassed many ingeniously construcr,ed statutes,

thd resu3ts of which have been to lead the

courts into various decisions more or less conflicting, asto
the scope of the same.
Commerce,to put it concisely, said Chief Justice Mar
shall,"is

intercourse and communication irterstatebetween

States and international between rnations ",
was said,"

and further it

to regulate commerce is t6 prescribe the rules

by which commerce is to be governed;

that is7 the conditions

on which it shall be conducted'(Gloucester Ferry Co.

v. Pn
-ra

114 U. S. 196-).
Commerce seems to have bee n divided by the d~cisiors

of the courts into

two classes, namely: such as is local,

and such as is national in its character. The first includes matters properly local and such as are incidents and
and the second, only such

aids t6 interstate commnerce;

matters as affect the public at large or are national.
From the wording of the clause it would seem ,

that

the power to regulate all coimerce,properly so called,
and that alone, and not such as is incidental and may be
justly

a part of the police

Congress.

-ower of the States,

So also , a history of the

rests

in

iiscussions at the

time of its adoption, would seem to bear us out in this
construction,
control

the chief end being to establish

one uniform

over the whole matter and thus to correct

the evil

of the existing authority in the several States and avoid
various discriminating laws .
Notwithstanding all

this,as to the first class,the

courts have uniformly held, from

Cooley v. Pennsylvania,

12 How. 299, down to the preaent, that the States and Congress have concurrent jurisdiction, so that where a State h
has passed a statute, it will be held valid, if not in
conflict with public policy or some act of Congress on the
same subject. (Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall.,

418,430;Henderson
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v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259;
v.

Gloucester Ferry Co.

Penna. 114 U. S. 196; Wabash R. R . Co. v. Illinois, 118

U. S. 557;

Miller on Const. 454 and cases cited.)
the courts have beri equally

As to the second class,

uniform in ho'lding that Congress has exclusive juri~dictiort
and that when it has riot exercised its power, it is conelusiveeevidence

that *Aintends

from legislation.

the same shall remain free

( Pickard v. Pullman Palace Car Co.

,

118 U. S. 34; Pembina Mining Co. v. Penna. 125 U. S. 181).
In other wo rds

, Congress alone has po rer to control com-

merce in matters susceptiAble of general and uniform regulation;but

that in

matters

that are effected by local legis-

the power to regulate commerce is possessed by loth

latior,

the Federal and State legislatures, Congress being supreme
whenever acting.Phila.&
326;

Steamship Co.

v.

Penna.,122 U.

Pembina Mining Co. v. Penna. 125 U. S. 181;

S.

in the

latter case many authorities are cited sustaining both
propositions.)
It

may be interesting

to note

one time
that at A United State

Courts held that this concurrent power applied the same
to the second class as it is now held that it applies to
first class.

( Pierce v. N. H.,

one of the License Cases,

5 Howard 564.)(

This ciassification,while not expressly stated, was
indicated by Johston J. in Gibbris v Ogden, 9 Wheat.,1,
and was expressly stated for the
Penina.,

first time in Cooley v.

12 How.299, which has ever since been the leading

authority. It held that the law regulating pilots arid
pilotage, though amounting to a regulationi of commerce,
not in conflict with an act of Congress,was valid. Cong-ress had to a limited extent regulated, the same, yet as
the State law did riot positively conflict with the acts of
Congress, it was held a valid exercise of State authority.
The broad rule was laid downthat "Whatever subjects of
this power are in their nature national or admit of only
one uniform system or plan of regulation may justly be
said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive regulation byr

Corigr.3ss".

While this dlassification may do very wel.l for convenience, arid the re gulation as to the second class be
properly controlled by Congress alone as just stated, yet
as to the first clams, it would seem, bearing in mind the
principle that "the power not dfelegated to the U n.ted

States by the constitution nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States,"
to concurrent power be )questioned.
said:-

that wel

minght

this righ

For as has well been

"The power sought to be exercised is either delega-

ted or reserved;either exclusive in Congress or the States.
There

is no middle ground."

From a logical standpoint it

would seem that a truer statement was never made, and on
what grounds the courts can legally justify their deviation
from the same, is not easily to be discerned.

The matter

should either be governed by the States and them alone, ur
by Congress and it alone.

If it is local and belongs to

the police power, and does not in effect regulate commerce
among the States,
late;

but if it

then it is proper for the States to legis

in reality does regulate commerce,then it

entirely outside the jurisdiction of the States, and Congress only can control it.

Were it otherwise

it would ad-

mit as it does at present,of the usurpation of the powers
of the States!)by that of the general government, and vice
versa when Congress has not acted.
cases show thid to be,
of the State

An examination of the

in most instances,

to the detriment

Congress having power at any time

to override

the statutes of the States, and in effect legislate upon

purely local matters.

Yet it has not been without the

opposite result in many cases. Byfruch a holding much
trouble and dispute in a certain line 6f cases would be
avoided.

There would, however, still remain the other

very perplexing question in a close case,

as to whether it

should fall on one side or the other of the dividing line
between State and congressiona

control, and to this we

will now turn our attention.
Upon this

class of cases,

while in general, the

United States courts have, with much accuracy, made many
just

discriminations,

still

there has been a marked tenden-

cy , especially in the last few years,to give to the States
control over matters belonging absolutely to Congress.
That the courts are by no means settled on this subject, is
also e vident from the fact that in nearly every close case
from two to four of the judges have dissented.
An exa

ination, in order, of

the many interest-

ing and important cases wavering about t-is border line
would alford much profit, yet as

this subject will not

per mit of so extensive a discussion, I can do no better
than torefer the reader to Cooley's Amer. Const. Law.pp. 69
69-74;

34 N. W.

1, especially the notes at page 11;

4 Harv.

Law Review, 221;

will be cited later,

cent references
of many cases

24 Am Law Review, 25;

and other more r(-

where

collections

in )oint may be found, in which various de-

cisions gave beeri reached.

By an exaiination of these, we

find evidence of two factions among the judges of the
United States Supreme Court;
would seem the better rule,

one holding strictly to what
that the only conditions or

taxes which a State may impose upon foreign corporatioa
engaged in interstate commerce, is that of a tax

upon its

real and personal property actually having a situs
the State.
been

mithin

That such a tax may be levied has uniformly
The other view, being more liberal with

sustained.J

the States seems to have been gradually giving the States
Step by step have they allowed a tax,

greater powers.

first on the property, the n in succession,on the capital
stock, business,

franchise, etc.,

While it has no

,in

each

case,been so galled , yet in effect it would seem to have
amounted to the same. Such have been the tendency of the
courts in the

line of cases of which the more important

are the following:
ern Union Tel.

Co.

Pullman Car Co .

Tel. Co. v. Mass. 125 U. S. 530; West
v.

Atty Gen.

of Mass.

v. Penna. 141 U. S. 18;

141 U.

S.

40;

ard

and Pullman Palace

Car Co. v. Hayward, 141 U. S. 3.

Vhile

these cases thuF

far may possibly be harmonized upon the ground asfthe court
dec~ded, that it was a tax upon property within the State a
an(*

ot upon a franchise or otherwise, yet it may be ques-

tic ied as

it

to whether they were in every case well decided.

would seem by

an examination of the,

141 U. S. 18 and previous decisions,

Pullman Car Case

that the very strong

dissentir-

opinion in

up to tlht

time cam a decision be foun holding that prop-

that case should prevail,

for nowhere

erty in transit through a State into another has a situs
within such State through which it may pass.
In the recent case of Grand Trunk R. R. Co. v. Maine
142 U. S. 226, we find a climax to this class of decisions
It is a c ase that is attracting much attention among

law-

ers and bids fair to be of continuing interest as well as
of great

importance. W3 will therefore consider the same at

length.
The Grand Trunk is a foreign railroad corporation
organized

in

Canada with headquarters

at Mortreal,

and in

1853 it leased ofa Maine, corporation its railroad operating
through Maine, New Hampshire and into Vermont, thus forning
a through line from Canada through the States named. Subsequently Maine passed a statute to the effect that every

corporation etc. operating a railroad in that State,should
pay to the State Treasurer for the use of the State, t"an
for the privilege of exercising its

annual excise tax
franchise"

in the State;

such tax to be ascertained substan

tially by dividing the gross amount of receipts from trans
total number of miles operated and

portation by the

multiplying this result by the number of miles in Maine. A
certain percentof this result constitutes the tax in question.

The company refused to pay the

same on the ground

that it was an interference with interstate commnerce,

and

hence this action by the State of Maine.
In a note on this case,it was well said: u The case
turned upon the

question ef the right

of a State to pass

statutes taxing the grosc receipts of a railroadfor each
mile operated within its limits regardless of the fact that
said road extended into other States and thus as it would
seem,was brought within the provisions of the constitution
as to regulations of interstate commerce as claimed by the
Grand

Trunk.

Nevertheless the Maine statute was held

constitutional on the ground that it provided an excise tax
for

the privilege

within the State,

of excercising the railroads franchise
i. e. for the right to engage in the bus-

iness of transportation .
The prevailing and dissenting opinions
both seem to assume
chise

of a

apparently

in

this

case,

that a State has a right to tax the fra2,

foreign interstate

commerce corporation,

the only difference

in

the two opinions

and
is

as

the mode of levying the same.

Were this strictly true it

would seem to be unimportant.

It would seem to ha ve

to

been

clearer if Judge Bradley had based his dissent upon the pl
plain ground, that a State has no right to tax a franchise
under such circumstances .

This was really the basis of

his decision, although he may properly have argued that it
was not for him to say that the

ingenuity &f man could, in

no way, invent a method by which such franchise might be
constitutionally taxed , for in reality it would in fact
seem inposible.
For convenience in the discussion of this case, we
will assume that a foreign corporation is organized and now
operating a railroad in the State of Pennsylvania an" is
desirous of entering New York for the purpose of carrying
on interstate commerce. The first question is, is it necesa
ry for the corporation to stop and knock at the door for
admission, or may it freely eriter therein without such

consent?

Is it a right to which they are entitled or is

it asubject of comity which : , be denied? In general
be aaid that it is a right
corporations

*vich cannot be denied to such

To this there might seem to be

.

exception before

it may

the posible

referreKc! to and which would furnish the most

favorable argument in support of the

Maine case,i.

e.

that

no railroad corporatiom engaging in or intending to engagin interstate cotunerce may lawfully enter the State of New
York or any other State for the purpose of carrying on or
engaging in interstate commerce without permissiom from 1
that State, for at the outset it would seem, before it can
lay a rail in that State,it must first obtain lawful possession of the land upon which to lay the same, and practiaally the only means of gaining the

title to such land is

through the right of eminent domain, for while in some
instances it might possibly buy up te necessary lands of
the individuals owning the same ,
the practioal

there !,ould still remainl

difficulties of obtaining the right to cross

public highways;

and again, while it may be said that they

might purchase the railroads of corporations already organized in that State, still that could riot be doriS tate

until the

had given the corporation the right to sell

the same

This right of eminent domain,they claim, is a sovereign
right

absolutely

resting

it, and exemption

in

sovereign power of the StLte

the

from taxation,and some others are extra-

ordinary franchises to which comity never extends and which
carn be gained

consent of the State.

only by the direct

being a sovereign right,no other
Thus

pel the exercise thereof.
instance

individual State ca n comit would seem that in each

the consent of the State must be had.

practically

Hence no

It

State being under a

compulsion

to grant

the permission of cordemning prope rty,may withhold

the same

entirely,or as would naturally follow, consent to the same
upon such conditions as it may sec

fit to impose, such as

that it shall pay a certain sum for all property confiscated
that it shall take out a license, pay certain taxes upon it
its franchise,
miight best
the Maine

etc..

It

is

upon this

reasoning that they i

endeavor to sustain the validity of the tax in
caes,

i.e.

to levy a

the right

tax on a

franchise

grrYtinF- the privile ge to carry on transportation within
arid through the State,though

Lhis be interstate commerve.

This unlimited power to prescribe conditions precedent,
and hence that of taxation,would seem logically to be sustained by the above reasoning.

But riot so,

for at this

point we are met face to face with another iine of argument which leads to an oppo~iite conclusion * Section VIII.
of Article I. of the United States Constitution reads as

follws:

"

Congress shall have power to regulate commmerce

between the nations, among the several States and with
with the Indian tribes@" What is granted to Congress by the
constitution is at the same time denied to the States.
Therefore whatever is meant by regulation of commerce, it
is certain that with that,the States have no riliht
fere in any way whatever.

to inter

That taxation is one of the most

conmon and most forcible means of re gulation, must be conceded .

Th at there can be no commerce without goods or

something to transport, and also that there can be none wil
out the

transportation of the same,I submit must also be

conceded.
as

The one is as an essential element

theother;

to commerce

they are inseparable. Hence that a tax upon e

one is alsc a tax upon the otrlermust without queition be
ar!-nowledged, and to say that tax upom either or both would
be a tax upon commerce, would be so entirely self evident
as to become superfluous.

That a tax upon the right of

transportation or a franchise granting the same as in the
Maine case, is also a tax upon the transportation itself

and hence as above shown upom commerce and upon the gross
recti~ts upon which the same is
conclusion.

estimated,is

an evitable

A tax upon comnmerce is a regulation upon com-

merce which belongs exclusively to Congress, and if exercised by a State,as in the Maine case,is unconstitutional.
Wetherefore.,from

these two lines of ressoninE

come to the conclusion, that while a State is

said to be

sovereign in its power,it is only so, so far

as these pow-

ers have not been delegated to the general government, and
when so delegated as is the regulation of commercethen the
exercise of' the same by the State becomes unconstitutional
and of no effect.
said,
Againas has beenany condition precedent to the entrance within the State of a foreign corporation not engagd
in interstate commerce, may be imposed;

but to this, a

corporatoonbeing Yield a person for the purpose of jurisdiction there is found to be an exception decided in the ca
case of Doyle v. Continental Ins.

Co. 94 U. S. 535, where

the State imposed a condition that no corporEtion shuld
appeal any case to the United States Courts.

It was held

that a corporation for this purpose being a citizenpand
the constitution providing

that no citizen in such cases

shall be ceprived of the right of appeal to those courts,

that the condition was unconstitutional and void and could
not be enforced. In other words while a State may impose
any condition precedent as a privilege of entering the Sta.te
such condition must riot be in conflict with the provisions
of the United States Constitution, for that is
to that each State must bow.

supreme and

So while State may not be compel

led to exercise the right of eminent domain, yet in exercie
ing it,

it

cannot annex any unconstitutional

Hence a tax on a franchise

condition.

for the right of tra isportati n

being a tax on transportation and therefore on commerce
cannot be

imposed as in the Maine case,

tion of commerce,

which is

it being a regula'-

under the control of Congress

alone.
As to eminent domain,we may conclude that no State
can refuse admittance

to a foreign corporation engaged in

interstate commerce by a direct act on its part; neither
can

it be compelled to act and grant this right in order

that a corporation may
on commerce .

enter

for the purpose of carrying

By its silenrce,it might seem to be able

to

keep such a corporation out , but it must be remembered
that the general government in its supreme power
cise this right

nay exer-

for all public purposes and grant the same

to corporations

engaged in

interstate

they be organized by the government
one of the States.
this power but it

commerce,
itself,

whether

or created by

It may take hold itself

and exercise

L

canrnot compel the States to exercise it.

A State cannot be mandamused.

This view is upheld in the

case of Stockton v.Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
state Coum.rce Reports 411.

Co. Vol. I

Inter

In that case the Staten Island

Rapid Tr ansit R. R. Co.,

by act of Congress was authorized

to build a bridge accross

"

Arthur Kill, a sound between

Staten Island and New Jersey.

The corporation was created

in New York and Crongress granted this right of eminent
domain.

The court held it to be a lawful exercise of the

same, and while this exercise was over a river, yet the
courts said

that the right would be the same over land.

Were this right denied to Congeess, then scarcely a
case could arise where the consent of the

State must not

first be obtained before carrying on interstate commerce.
And effective barrier would thus be interposed to the execution of the constitutionai power vested in Congress.
Again by the weight of authority

it

would seem that

that sane conclusion would be reached in regard to the
Maine case.

Should an individual, a partnership, an association,
in fact any one or any thing short of a corporation, engege
in interstate commerce, never for a moment, would the rigt.
of a State

to tax the same

for such privilege, or in any

manner whatever other than to tax the property actually
having a situs

within the State

, be claimed.

What authority there is for singling out a corporation, by means of which mos t or all of this kind of business is carried on, and taxing it freely is a question
difficult to answer.

The clause in question says that Con-

gress shall have power to regulate commerce.

It does not

say or mean simply when it is carried on in any particular
manner or by any particular person, but rather in all cases
whether by a citizen or corporation
In Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pnrina. 114 U. S. 196,
the court said : "Interstate commerc,, by a corporation tr
is entitled to the same protection against State exaction
which is given to sucb commerce when carrie

on by individ

uals."

When thiE

.lause was adopted there were in existences

as stated in Banr: of Augusta v. Earle, 15 Pet. 519, many
large corporations carrying on this business between nations

59

arid the court in that case after enumerating some of the
corporations so engaged, suid:

"This state of facts forbids

it
the supposition that was intended in the grant to Congress,
to exclude

from its

The language

control

the

comnrece of corporations.

of the grant makes mo reference

to the

mentalities by which commerce may be carried on;

instru-

it is ger-

eral and includes alike commerce by individuals, partnerships, associations, and corporations."

Again, the powel

given to Congress to regulate commerce is not confined to
the

instrumentalities of commerce known or in use when the

constitution was adopted, but keeps pace with the progresz
of the country and adapts itself to the new developments of
time and the surrounding circumstances.

(Pensacola Tel.

Co.

v. Wertern Union Tel. Co. 6 Otto, 1-24.)
In Crutcher v. Comm. of Ky. 141 U. S.
said:
take

47,

the court

"If a parttership firm of individuals should underto carry on the business of interstate

comnerce be-

tween Kentuckey and other States, it would riot be within th
the province
on which

of the State legislature

t hey should carry on their

to exact conditions
business,

require them to take out a license therefor.

nor to
To carry on

interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege

granted by tha State;
theUhited States

it is a right which every citizen of

is entitled to exercise under the

tution arad laws of the United States;

consti-

and the accession of

mere corporate facilities as a matter of coravenience in
carrying on their business cannot have the effect of depriv
irig them of such right, unless Couigress shall see fit

to

interpose some contrary regulation on the subject."
Again in the Gloucester Case the court said:
it is conceded that the property in a

" While

State belonging to

a foreign vorporation engaged in foreign or interstate commerce may be taxed equally with

like property of a domestic

corporation engaged in that business,

we are clear that a

tax or other burden imposed on the property of either corpo
ration because it

is used to carry on that commerce, or

upon the transportation of persons or property,--

is

invalid and void as an interference with and an obstruction of the powers of Congress
commerce."

in the regulation of such

Again in the Puliman Car Case the court said:

"Much reliance

is also placed by the plaintiff in error

upon tne cases in which this court has decided that citizen
or corp rations of one State cannot be taxed by

another 4

State, for a license or privilege to carry on inters tate
or foreign commerce within its limits. But in each of those

cases,the tax was riot upon the property employed in the
businessbut upon the right to carry on the business at ali,
and was therefore held to impose a direct burden upon the
commerce itself. (Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69; Pickard v. Car Co. 117 U. S. 34;
U. S. 4,S9;

Robbins v. Taxing Dist.,

Leloup v o Mobile, 127 u. S.,

In Leloup v. Mobile,

120

64.)

overruling Osburn v. Mobile, a

case cited by plaintiffs attorney in the Maine Casethe
courts held that a license tax upon a Telegraph Co. 1 engaged
in

sending messages within and without the State was void.

The broad rule was laid down "That no State has a right to
lay a tax on interstate cormnerce in any form, whether by
way of duties laid on transportation of the subjects of
that cornerce ,

or on the receipts derived from that trans-

portation , or on the occupation or business of carrying
it on, and the reason is that such taxation is a burden on
that commerce and amounts to a regulation of it."

To the

same effect is the case of Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129,
A case exactly in point would seem to be the Crutcher case,above cited.

The

trial and argument of this cise

was based solely upon an agreed statement

of facts, in

which it was specifically settledthat for the purposes

of

this case,
a

the express company was to be considered

foreign corporation,

confining

,hemselves

a Kentucky

rio matter what it

to this agreement

statute requiring

States Expr'ess Company,

was

in

fact,

interference
stantial

,

that an agent of the United

before

it

shall be allowed to enter

w.s R.

R.

coninel'ce.
Co.

v.

To the same sub-

.:nia,

is claimed that these cases are not

136U.

from engaging

S.

114.

It

in point,because, unless

the conditions imposed are complied with ,
would be prevented

should

was unconstitutional arid void as an

with interstate

effect

arid

the court held that

thatS tate and solicit business for that Company ,
take out a license

as

irn interstate

the corporation
commerce,

while in the Maine Case, the State does riot say that they
cannot come in and engage in interstate commerce, but rathe
that after they are in and so engaged ,
right to tax them.

This argument would seem to be very

immaterial, for iri either, case the
the same ef4!ect;

that they claim the

t

tax if paid, ould have

would amount to a

The only case ci 4d in
opinion in the Maine Case

tax on connerce.

suppof't of the prevailing

,was that of an irsurance company

and as insurance companies are riot

held to be e ngaged in

interstate commerce, it would riot seem to be in point.

Another case which the attorneys for the State placed much
reliance upon, is that of the State tax on RAilway G! oss
Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, but this case has been practically
overruled in the Steamship Co. v. Penna. 122 U. S. 326,
also in Fargo v. Mich. 121 U. S. 230, arid numerous other
cases which might be cited.Besides the State Tix Cases
were really decided upon the ground that it was a tax upon
the gross receipts after they had been mingled with the property of the State,

the corporation being a domestic corpo-

Therefore, it could not be in point, for in the

ration.

Maine Case the corporation was a foreign corp. with its headquarters at Montreal, and in all probabilities no part of
the gross receipts ever became mingled with the property
in the State of Maine.
Many more cases might be cited supporting the view
taken but most of the m may be found cited in those already ref-_red to.
Again,
on interstate

it

is

argued that the privilege

commerce

within that State,

through Maine,

may be

of carrying
taxed as such

but as above seen,,in the Crutcher case,

the right te engage in commerce is no

a franchise.

The ,t

corporation does not need a franchise for that purpose;

it

is a right secured to it by the U. S. Constitution.

If it

does riot need it, it certainly can have no value, and
being of no value,

it lacks one of the necessary elements

of proserty, and hence

cannot be taxed as such.

From the above we may draw the conclusion that

while

there is one class odf decisions, holding strictly that the
only tax which a State

may impose upom a foreign corporatin

engaged in interstate commerce, is that of a tax upon its
propertyactually having

a situs within the State,

equally with other property, yet there

and that

is also an increas-

ing line of decisions, holding that it may tax its property
chartercapital stock, etc.,

and as a climax to the whole,

according to the Maine case, it may tax its
the gross receipts.

franchise and

In regard to this case Bradley, J.,

in his dissenting opinion, said:

"

It comes to this:

A Stat

may tax a railroad company upom its gross receipts in proportion to the number of miles run within tke

State as a

tax on its property, and may also lay a tax upon these same
gross receipts in proportion to the same number of miles
ror the privilege of exercising its franchise in the State."

for
And further, he says, I know not what else it may not be
taxed.

It would seem from the above that a State Yiiy even
practically exclude such corporations entirely by
increasing

that would riot amount

lo

a

tax

to know what

would be difficult

it

upon commerce,then
would.

and if

the tax,

3imply

It would seem that the effect of the commercial cl

clause of the U. S. Constitution is thus substantially
wiped out.
How tne Maine and Crutcher cases can be harmonized
and others can be

and Pickard cases ,

how the Pullman Car

harmonized, is difficult to ascertain*
effect at least, that

It

would seem,

in

they cannot be.

Thus it appears, that on so important a subject as
this,

the United States courts are

with a strong tendency
by the States.

It

in hopeless confusion,

favoring the control of the matter

would seem, that

the same unlimited power

and distructive effects existing under the Confederacy and
which gave rise

in part to the adoption of the constitu-

tion are destihed to again appear;

that retaliation may be

freely exercised among the States;

The disasterous exper-

iences during that

perio

are not involved in obscurity.

That something shoald be done to check this tendency

is evident.

What

it shall be is the next question.

Scarcely could we expect, the courts, with an ever-changing
personnel,to effect this change with a sufficient degree

of

pe rmanenc y.
It would seem that the better way would be, by an
act of Congress requiring every corporation, intending to
so engage to organize under a general statute of the United
States, such corpor ations so organized being unquestionably free from these objections.

But better stiii, as be-

fore suggested, would be an amendment to the United States
Constitution, to the effect that a corporation be considered a citizen.
In either case it should be based on the
as Bradley, J.,
preme over

says:

"That the power of Congress

is su-

the whole subject, unimpeded and unimbarrassed

by State lines or State
try is one, and the
and that

principles,

laws;

work to

that in this matter the coun-

be accomplished is national;

State interests, State jealousies, and State pre* -

judicies do not require to be consulted.

In matters of

foreign and interstate commerce there are no St.te s."

